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TRUST, BETRAYAL, AND WHISTLE-BLOWING:
REFLECTIONS ON THE EDWARD SNOWDEN CASE
Herman T. Tavani
Rivier University

Frances S. Grodzinsky
Sacred Heart University

Abstract
Is every act of whistle blowing, by definition, a betrayal of trust on the part of the whistleblower? If so, are employees who blow the whistle, by implication, untrustworthy
employees? Assuming that they are, would employees who blow the whistle (presumably on
the grounds of moral obligation) also be willing to concede that they are not trustworthy
employees, by virtue of carrying out their whistle-blowing act(s)? In answering these
questions, we first propose some working definitions of whistle-blowing, trust, and
trustworthiness. We then ask whether some instances of whistle-blowing are morally
permissible (and perhaps also morally required), even if it turns out that an employee’s act
of whistle-blowing always violates (“betrays”) the trust relationship between that
employee and his/her employer. Next, we examine a framework that purports to
differentiate between cases of whistle-blowing that are morally permissible, and those that
are morally required. Finally, we apply that model in our analysis of a recent case involving
Edward Snowden, an employee, who intentionally leaked sensitive US-government
information to the press.
Keywords: Edward Snowden, Trust, Trustworthiness, Trust Betrayal, Whistle-blowing

1 Introduction and Background
Most people seem to assume that trustworthiness (in general) is an inherently good
thing and that betrayal is an inherently bad thing, such that one’s being trustworthy is
always a desirable quality or positive character trait, while one’s betraying the trust of
someone or some group/organization/nation is viewed in a negative light. But we
question that assumption; for example, is one’s being trustworthy always an intrinsically
good trait? Consider that people who do evil things – e.g., “hit men” for the Mafia, or the
Nazi officers who carried out executions in death camps – may have been very
“trustworthy employees.” In these cases, many people would likely say that the
individuals involved should have intentionally violated the trust relationships they had
with their respective employers (by blowing the whistle), even if that also meant
betraying the trustor(s) involved.1 But some whistle-blowers, as well as some people
1

The idea for examining trustworthiness vis-à-vis betrayal of trust in whistle-blowing contexts developed from
discussions with Lloyd Carr, whose work on trust and rational agents (Carr 2014) suggests that there is an
explicit recognition on the part of the agent (i.e., the whistle-blower) that he/she has clearly the betrayed the trust
of the organization that had initially entered into the trust relationship with that agent. While we do not commit
to the view that there is an explicit recognition of betrayal on the part of whistle-blowers, we nevertheless
explore some of the logical relations between the concepts of trust/trustworthiness and betrayal in whistleblowing cases, with a special focus on the controversy involving Edward Snowden.

who are inclined to defend them, might take a different tack by using the following kind
of rationale: “X was not really betraying the trust of his/her employer, rather X was
simply doing the right (honorable, moral, etc.) thing by blowing the whistle.” Can this
kind of rationale – one that is reduced to a “not-P but Q” kind of claim, as opposed to a
situation in which both “P and Q” are acknowledged to be true – be viewed as plausible?
To see the central problem, or logical flaw, with this kind of rationale, consider a case
that is unrelated either to trust or whistle-blowing – one involving the controversial USA
Patriot Act. Many of the Act’s supporters claim that (i) “The Patriot Act does not violate
the civil liberties of US citizens, but instead protects Americans from future terrorist
attacks.” Opponents, on the other hand, claim that (ii) “The Patriot Act clearly violates
civil liberties, and that there is no evidence that the enforcement of this act protects
Americans from future terrorist attacks.” But why can’t specific clauses in (i) and (ii)
both be true? After all, there is no contradiction involved in asserting the following
conjunction (iii): The Patriot Act both protects Americans against future terrorist
attacks and violates the civil liberties of American citizens. However, political
conservatives in the US tend to reject the claim that the Patriot Act violates civil liberties,
and many liberals are skeptical regarding how much that act protects Americans
(suggesting instead that the US government uses that rationale as a convenient foil to
spy on its citizens). So, it would seem that in the case of the Patriot Act, one’s political
ideology can obstruct one’s ability to reason critically in defending either side in this
controversy. We will also see how this conceptual/logical confusion might also work in
obscuring the inherent tensions involved in trustworthiness and betrayal on the part of
employees who blow the whistle.

2 Whistle-blowing, Trust, and Trustworthiness in an Employment
Context
Before examining the concept of a trust relationship in an employer-employee context,
we consider a working definition of whistle-blowing. Sisela Bok (2003) defines a whistle
blower as an individual who makes “revelations meant to call attention to negligence,
abuses, or dangers that threaten the public interest.” According to Bok, whistle blowing
can be viewed as a form of dissent; but whereas dissent can arise from all forms of
disagreement (e.g., religious, political, etc.), Bok argues that whistle blowing has the
“narrower aim of casting light on negligence or abuse, or of alerting the public to a risk.” 2
Some analysts view whistle blowers as courageous employees who should, in certain
cases at least, be praised for their heroic actions. Others, however, see whistle blowers
as traitors, as well as snitches and spies (Brenkert 2010). So, not surprisingly, ethicists
and legal scholars have debated the merits vs. the harms associated with whistle
blowing. But before we consider whether some instances of whistle blowing can be
justified on moral grounds, we first briefly examine the concepts of trust and
trustworthiness in the context of an employer–employee relationship.
What, exactly, do we mean by a trust relationship in an employer-employee context?
And what is the nature of the (more general) relationship between trust and
2

Our discussion of whistle-blowing definitions here draws from Tavani (2013).

trustworthiness? We believe that trust (in general) is best understood as a normative
relation between two agents: a trustor and a trustee. 3 Trustworthiness, on the other
hand, is typically regarded as a characteristic, property, or attribute that applies (only)
to the trustee. So it is important to distinguish between trust qua (normative) relation
(affecting two agents, a trustor and a trustee) and trustworthiness qua
property/characteristic of the trustee. It is also important to note at this point that in
whistle-blowing scenarios, the agents involved in the trust relationships can be either
individual human agents or an aggregate of human agents such as a corporation or
organization.4 A trust relationship in an employment context can take many forms; for
our purposes, however, it can be understood as a normative relationship between an
employer and employee where the employer expects an employee not to disclose
information about the employer to the public without first getting permission. Often this
is formalized in a non-disclosure agreement. In this scheme, then, all acts of whistleblowing by an employee always violate the employer-employee trust relationship;
hence, an employee who blows the whistle must be regarded as an “untrustworthy”
agent in the context of that relationship.
Contrary to what many people seem to assume, however, trustworthiness need not be
understood as simply a binary concept, where someone either is or is not trustworthy (in
toto). For example, someone may be a very trustworthy spouse and father, but be
untrustworthy as an athlete (by using Performance Enhancing Drugs). A person might
also be highly trustworthy as a military officer, yet untrustworthy as a spouse. In this
sense, trustworthiness needs to be understood as “context-sensitive” and “state-like,”
rather than general and “trait-like” (Buechner, Simon, and Tavani, 2014). Yet many
people assume that if some agent, X, is untrustworthy in respect Y, that agent must be
untrustworthy in general. However, once we see that this view is inadequate, we also see
why it is not necessarily a bad thing for some agent (X) to be untrustworthy in some
respect or situation (Y) but not in another (Z) – e.g., in a specific context, such as an
employment context involving whistle-blowing. Of course, it does not follow from this
that it is ipso facto morally permissible for a trustee to be untrustworthy in every
employment context where a whistle-blowing act is being considered.

3 When is an Act of Whistle-Blowing Morally Justified?
Providing clear-cut criteria for justifying whistle blowing on moral grounds has proved
to be very difficult, and the schemes for doing so have often been very controversial.
Nevertheless, some very thoughtful frameworks for this have been put forth. We
examine and then apply a model advanced by Richard De George (1999).5 Focusing on

3

For an interesting analysis of theories of trust proposed in the past twenty-or-so years, see Taddeo (2009). Also,
see Simon (2013) for an excellent bibliography of the available literature on trust.
4
In the present essay, we examine the concepts of trust and trustworthiness only as they apply in the case of
human agents and institutions (i.e., aggregates of human agents); we do not extend this to include artificial
agents (AAs) such as “machines.” For a fuller account of the distinction between trust and trustworthiness, as
well as for a critique of the standard account of trustworthiness as a characteristic or property that affects only
the trustee in a trust relationship, see Buechner, Simon, and Tavani (2014).
5
One might ask why we have selected the De George model, as opposed to alternative models. As Brenkert
(2010) points out, De George’s model is one of the most frequently cited among business ethicists. So we

employer-employee relationships in the context of an engineering environment, De
George proposes a set of conditions that must be satisfied for an employee to justifiably
blow the whistle. His scheme also differentiates when an employee (in his examples, an
engineer) is morally permitted to blow the whistle from when an employee is morally
obligated to do so. De George argues that engineers (and other workers) are morally
permitted to go public with information when:
1. Something (e.g., some practice, some product, etc.) will likely do “serious and
considerable harm” to the public.
2. The employee(s) have reported the “serious threat” to their immediate
supervisor(s).
3. The employee(s) have “exhausted the internal procedures and possibilities” within
the company, including going to the board of directors, having received no support
from their immediate supervisor(s).6
De George further argues that although one is morally permitted to blow the whistle
when these three conditions are satisfied, he or she is not morally required, or obligated,
to do so. For the latter to obtain, De George believes that two additional conditions must
also be satisfied:
4. The employees have “accessible, documented evidence that would convince a
reasonable, impartial, observer that one’s view of the situation is correct.”
5. The employees have “good reasons to believe that by going public the necessary
changes will be brought about.”7
There are numerous cases of whistle-blowing in engineering contexts where De George’s
criteria can easily be applied in a fairly straight-forward manner. Consider, for example,
the now classic whistle-blowing cases involving the Ford Pinto (automobile) and the
Space Shuttle Challenger. But can De George’s model also be easily applied in whistleblowing incidents in non-engineering contexts as well? In particular, we ask whether
that model can guide us in assessing a recent whistle-blowing controversy involving
Edward Snowden.

4 The Case of Edward Snowden
Edward Snowden, a former employee of NSA contractor Booz Allen Hamilton, leaked
sensitive material to The Guardian and the Washington Post. Some of Snowden’s critics
believe that the sheer scale of the material involved makes it the “most significant leak in
US history.” The leaked reports, published in May 2013, revealed a number Internet
surveillance programs used by the NSA; these included the Tempora, PRISM, and
XKeyscore programs, as well as information involving metadata from telephone
interceptions in the US and Europe. What are the moral implications involved, and how
should Snowden’s behavior be assessed? Depending on one’s point of view, Snowden’s
believe that it would be fruitful to apply this whistle-blowing model as our “litmus test” in the Snowden
controversy.
6
The full text for these three conditions is included in De George (1999), pp. 251-253.
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See De George, pp. 250-256 for the full text of his five conditions for whistle blowing. Our analysis of De
George’s model in this section draws from material in Tavani (2013).

whistle-blowing activities (resulting in the leaks to the international media) were either
a horrible deed or a courageous act. While Snowden’s critics have described him as a
“dissident” and a “traitor” (who has also caused grave damage to US intelligence
capabilities), his defenders see him him as a “hero” and a “patriot” (because the US
Government, through the NSA, had gone too far in its surveillance practice on its own
citizens and the leaders of closely allied nations).
Snowden has claimed that his "sole motive" for leaking the documents was "to inform
the public as to that which is done in their name and that which is done against them”
(Rieder, 2013). Arguing in his own defense, by appealing to the interests of the
international community, Snowden cites Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. He also states:
I believe in the principle declared at Nuremberg in 1945: “Individuals have international
duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience.” Therefore individual
citizens have the duty to violate domestic laws to prevent crimes against peace and
humanity from occurring.”

In attempting to justify his actions as an American citizen, Snowden claims:
The 4th and 5th Amendments to the Constitution of my country…forbid such systems of
massive, pervasive surveillance. While the US Constitution marks these programs as
illegal, my government argues that secret court rulings, which the world is not permitted
to see, somehow legitimize an illegal affair.... (Snowden, 2013).

He further asserts, “I took an oath to support and defend the Constitution. And I saw the
Constitution was being violated on a massive scale” (Griggs and Gross, 2014). In June
2014, the US Government officially charged Snowden with “theft of government
property, unauthorized communication of national defense information” and “willful
communication of classified communications intelligence information to an
unauthorized person.” In part, the charges against Snowden were brought under the
Espionage Act (See Finn and Horwitz, 2013). But our main concern in this paper is not so
much with the legality of Snowden’s behavior, but with whether Snowden’s actions were
morally justifiable (i.e., either morally permissible, or possibly even morally required, in
light of the five criteria specified in De George’s framework.)

5 Applying De Gorge’s Whistle-Blowing Model to the Snowden Case
Arguably, the first criterion or condition in De George’s model was satisfied in the
Snowden case – viz., the NSA’s practice with respect to surveillance did cause some
“serious and considerable harm” to the public in the form of mass surveillance of the
phone uses and Internet practices of US citizens. Even if one objects that no American
citizens were physically harmed in the Snowden incident, the international fallout from
the disclosure that “friendly” heads of states were being monitored clearly harmed the
US’s reputation abroad. However, because we have no evidence suggesting that
Snowden had first gone to (any of) his superiors before going public with the
information about NSA’s surveillance practices, it is difficult to argue that Snowden had

satisfied De George’s second and third conditions. And if Snowden had failed to do that,
then it would appear to follow (on De George’s criteria), that Snowden’s whistle-blowing
act was not morally permissible. In that case, there would be no need to ask whether
Snowden’s act of whistle-blowing was morally required (i.e., whether Snowden satisfied
De George’s fourth and fifth conditions). However, we should note that according to an
interview with Ellsburg, one of the reasons that Snowden did not pursue the appropriate
chain of superiors in his organization is that he saw what had happened to those people
who did go forward to their supervisors in previous incidents; for example, he knew that
the FBI had conducted early morning raids on each of the suspects, including
confiscation of computers and “thumb drives,” based on the suspicion that they might
have been the leakers of information. (Democracynow, 2014).
So it is possible that Snowden had reasonable and justifiable grounds for not complying
with De George’s second and third conditions. But let us next assume, for sake of
argument, that Snowden had satisfied conditions 1-3 in De George’s scheme. We can
then ask whether Snowden would also have been morally required/obligated to go
public with the information. In this case, perhaps somewhat ironically given Snowden’s
(apparent) failure to satisfy conditions 2 and 3, Snowden could plausibly be said to
satisfy conditions 4 and 5. Consider that in compliance with De George’s fourth
condition, Snowden had “documented evidence that would convince a reasonable,
impartial, observer that one’s view of the situation is correct.” Also, consistent with
condition 5, Snowden had “good reasons to believe that by going public the necessary
changes will be brought about.” So, Snowden seems to have met De George’s criteria for
being morally obligated to go public, despite his (apparent) failing to satisfy two of the
conditions that De George specifies for being morally permitted to blow the whistle.
Of course, we can question whether De George's criteria are too stringent, as some
critics have suggested, or too lenient as others have argued. However, we will not pursue
that debate here. We conclude our discussion by noting that one virtue of De George's
model is that in many cases it has provided a fairly clear and straightforward set of
guidelines for engineers to consider in a morally complex case without also requiring
them to be what De George calls “moral heroes,” and what others call “moral saints.” But
we also note a potential defect in his model: it seems possible (as in the Snowden case)
for an agent (qua employee) to be morally obligated to blow the whistle even when that
agent fails to satisfy all of the preceding requirements necessary to be morally permitted
to blow the whistle. So, what are to make of this anomaly in the application of De
George’s model in the Snowden case?8 For example, what if both the employer and chain
of command has proved untrustworthy? According to Daniel Ellsberg, one of the most
8

Why does this anomaly present a serious challenge for De George’s model? We saw that Conditions 1-3
constitute the set of necessary conditions for justifying a whistle-blowing act on moral grounds. So, failure to
satisfy all three conditions means that, technically, one cannot proceed to Conditions 4-5 to evaluate the whistleblowing situation in the Snowden case. Yet there is something counterintuitive here – how can one be morally
required to do something, X, if one is not morally permitted to do X. An analogy involving this kind of anomaly
can be found in satisfying the conditions required for “just war,” where we are told that conditions 1-4 must be
satisfied for a nation to (morally) enter into war (jus ante bellum). Only then, we are further told, can a nation be
evaluated as satisfying the next two conditions in just war theory – viz., the conditions for carrying out a just war
(jus in bello). But we can certainly think of one or more cases where a nation may have conducted a war justly
(i.e., morally) in bello, yet potentially still have failed to satisfy one or more of the ante-bellum conditions.

famous whistleblowers, Snowden “learned from … the experience of four or five NSA
senior officials [who] went to their superiors in great detail when they thought the
program …was unconstitutional and …should be modified or changed or dropped. They
got no response from that, and their recommendations were simply ignored”
(Democracynow, 2014). To compound this, Snowden saw the head of the NSA lie to a
U.S. Congressional committee and saw Congress accept these lies, even though some of
the participants have since admitted that they knew they were being lied to. Therefore,
Ellsberg concludes that “Snowden knew that it would be foolish and hopeless for him to
try to call attention to this within the channels” (Democracynow, 2014). Would the same
hold true, for example, in the case of other high-stakes whistle-blowing incidents, such
as the one involving WikiLeaks.

6 Whistle-Blowing Activities in the Snowden Case vs. WikiLeaks
Some people might be inclined to associate or even link together whistle-blowing
activities affecting the Snowden case and WikiLeaks. So, an interesting question to
consider is: How is the Snowden case both similar to and different from WikiLeaks, with
respect to whistle-blowing activities? For one thing, both the Snowden and the
WikiLeaks controversies involved national security leaks in which sensitive national
security was leaked, affecting many sovereign nation states, especially the US. The two
cases might also, at some general level, both be viewed as instances of high-stakes
whistle-blowing-related incidents where the general public was better served because of
the leaks involving classified government documents. However, many believe that the
kinds of potential justifications and defenses involved in the Snowden case differ
significantly from those of WikiLeaks.
In his examination of WikiLeaks’ activities from the vantage point of whistle-blowing,
Luciano Floridi (2013) identifies two key problems with trying to support that
organization’s (whistle-blowing) activities on ethical grounds: (i) WikiLeaks’ motivation
was based on resentment (and the intent to cause harm to its target), and (ii) WikiLeaks’
activities put some innocent people at risk. Floridi also points out that some of
WikiLeaks’ supporters have tried to justify that organization’s practices by appealing
either to consequentialist/utilitarian or deontological theories, or both. But Floridi
believes that neither kind of ethical theory can be used successfully to justify WikiLeaks’
practices.
We can see how the Snowden case differs from WikiLeaks in at least one of the two key
respects described by Floridi. Although Snowden’s activities may have put some
innocent people at risk, it is in no way clear that Snowden’s motivation was based on
resentment (as it appears to be in the case of WikiLeaks and Julian Assange). And while
Floridi may be correct in asserting that the whistle-blowing activities in the WikiLeaks
incident cannot be justified on consequentialist or utilitarian grounds, it is not clear to
the present authors that the same is true in the Snowden case. In fact, we believe that it
may be possible to make a very strong utilitarian argument in defense of both WikiLeaks
and Snowden’s activities. But that would be the topic for a different paper and thus will
not be pursued here.

7 Some Alternative Models of Whistle Blowing
Before concluding this paper, we should note that George Brenkert (2010) suggests that
the “standard” whistle-blowing models can be understood in terms of three broad kinds
of theories: the “harm,” “complicity,” and “good reasons” theories. In Brenkert’s scheme,
De George’s model is an example of the harm theory of whistle-blowing, since it
concentrates on criteria affecting “serious harm” as the principal grounds for an
employee’s moral justification for blowing the whistle. 9 Brenkert has criticized De
George’s model for focusing too closely on the criterion of harm, at the expense of
ignoring alternative conditions that take into account a broader range of factors such as
“wrong doing,” which need not include harm, especially physical harm. In this sense,
Brenkert suggests that Michael Davis’s complicity theory (Davis, 1996) has an advantage
over conventional “harm theories” because there can be cases where harm itself does
not seem to be at issue so much as our obligation to “avoid doing moral wrongs”
(Brenkert, p. 571).
Brenkert is also critical of the complicity model, however, arguing instead for what he
calls an “integrity theory of whistle blowing.” Brenkert (p. 575) argues that because of
“one’s association or membership with an organization, one takes on certain
responsibilities one would not otherwise have.” And focusing on concerns affecting
moral “wrong doing,” as opposed solely to harm-related concerns involving an
organization, Brenkert proposes his Principle of Positional Responsibility (PPR) and the
“integrity considerations of one’s commitment to PPR” in determining when one has a
responsibility to blow the whistle. Unfortunately, a full review of Brenkert’s theory
would take us beyond the scope of the present work. We believe that his integrity theory
is worth mentioning, however, because it addresses some of the concerns that the
present authors have with the De George model. As noted in the preceding section, we
find De George’s model problematic in the Snowden case, mainly because it suggests that
Snowden’s actions might be justified as morally required/obligated even though it is not
clear that Snowden had satisfied all of De George’s conditions for one’s being morally
permitted to blow the whistle.

8 Concluding Remarks
We have argued that Snowden may have been justified in blowing the whistle on NSA’s
surveillance practices – perhaps even morally obligated to do so – based on our
interpretation of the conditions specified in De George’s model. However, we have also
argued that Snowden, as a whistle-blower, would, by extension, be classified as an
untrustworthy employee and as a “betrayer of his employee’s trust,” regardless of
whether his whistle-blowing acts were morally permissible or even morally required.
There are, however, some interesting twists in this case – both in the way in which
Snowden probably found the NSA to be an "untrustworthy agent" and in the potential
flaw in De George's model where an employee might be required/obligated to blow the
whistle (given the satisfaction of Conditions 4 and 5), yet not permitted to do so
9

Brenkert also notes that Michael Davis’ whistle-blowing model (Davis, 1996) is an example of the complicity
theory, while Sisela Bok’s model (briefly described in our analysis of definitions of whistle blowing in Section
2) is an instance of the “good reasons” theory of whistle blowing (Bok, 2003).

(because of failure to satisfy Conditions 1-3). One could surmise that the perceived
untrustworthiness of the NSA on the part of Snowden precipitated his action. We should
also note that on the various levels of trust regarding this incident, the American public,
while perhaps not in total agreement with Snowden’s methods, tends to trust the
veracity of what he revealed vs. the NSA’s claims.
So it would seem that there can be cases when it is morally permissible (and perhaps
even morally required) for someone to be untrustworthy and to act in a way that betrays
the trust of one’s employer. If this is the case, then trustworthiness is not an inherently
good trait, and betrayal (of trust) is not always necessarily a bad act. It also follows that
a whistle blower such as Snowden does not have to deny the charge that he was
untrustworthy and the charge that he betrayed the trust of his employer (and the NSA)
to justify his act of whistle blowing on moral grounds.

References
Bok, S. (2003). “The Morality of Whistle Blowing.” In Computers, Ethics, and Society. 3rd. ed. (Edited by M.
D. Ermann and M.S. Shauf,). New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 47-54.
Brenkert, G.C. (2010). “Whistle-Blowing, Moral Integrity, and Organizational Ethics.” In The Oxford
Handbook of Business Ethics. (Edited by G.C. Brenkert and T.L. Beauchamp). New York: Oxford University
Press, pp. 563-601.
Buechner, J., Simon, J., and Tavani, H.T. (2014). “Re-Thinking Trust and Trustworthiness in Digital
Environments.” In Autonomous Technologies: Philosophical Issues, Practical Solutions, Human Nature:
Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Computer Ethics – Philosophical Enquiry: CEPE 2013.
(Edited by E. Buchanan, et al.). Menomonie, WI: INSEIT, pp. 65-79.
Carr, L. (2014). “Self-Trust within Trust Betrayal: The Whistle Blower.” Available at
http://www.rivier.edu/faculty/lcarr/Self-trust%20within%20trust%20betrayal%20%20the%20whistleblower.pdf.
Davis, M. (1996). “Some Paradoxes of Whistleblowing.” Business & Professional Ethics Journal 15, no. 1: 319.
De George, R.T. (1999). Business Ethics. 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Democracynow.org (2014). “Debate: Was Snowden Justified? Former NSA Counsel Stewart Baker vs.
Whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg. Available at
http://www.democracynow.org/2014/2/14/debate_was_snowden_justified_former_nsa#. Accessed
3/19/14.
Finn, P., and Horwitz, S. (2013). “U.S. Charges Snowden with Espionage.” The Washington Post, June 21.
Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-charges-snowden-withespionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_story.html. Accessed 12/2/13.
Floridi, L. (2013). “The Ethical Evaluation of WikiLeaks.” In Contemporary Moral Issues: Diversity and
Consensus. (Edited by L. Hinman). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, pp. 475-477.
Griggs, B., and Gross, D. (2014). “Edward Snowden speaks at SXSW, calls for public oversight of U.S. spy
programs”. Available at http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/10/tech/web/edward-snowden-sxsw/.
Accessed 3/12/14.

Rieder, R. (2013). “Snowden's NSA bombshell sparks debate.” USA Today, June 13. Available at
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/rieder/2013/06/12/rem-riedersurveillance/2415753/. Accessed 11/30/13.
Simon, J. (2013). “Trust.” Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy (Edited by D. Pritchard). New York: Oxford
University Press. Available at: http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0157.xml.
Snowden, E. (2013). “Statement to Human Rights group (in Full).” The Daily Telegraph, July 12. Available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10176529/Edward-Snowdens-statementto-human-rights-groups-in-full.html. Accessed 11/30/13.
Taddeo, M. (2009). “Defining Trust and E-Trust: Old Theories and New Problems.” International Journal of
Technology and Human Interaction 5, no. 2: 23-35.
Tavani, H.T. (2013). Ethics and Technology; Controversies, Questions, and Strategies for Ethical Computing.
4th ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.

